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The President of Belarus Alexander Lukashenka 
visited Vilnius on September 16. The timetable of 
the visit provided that he would meet the President 
of Lithuania Dalia Grybauskaite, participate in the 
opening of the Lithuanian-Belarusian International 
Economic Forum Belarus  and the Baltic Sea States: 
New Opportunities for Enhanced Cooperation, 
open the Belarusian national exhibition Belarus 
Expo 2009. This was the first visit of the Belarusian 
leader to Lithuania since 1998 and the second to 
the EU member state in the recent decade. What 
is the meaning of the pending A. Lukashenka’s 
visit for the EU, Lithuania and Belarus itself, which 
at present tries to improve its relations with the 
West? There should be no doubts that the visit is 
a constituent part of the new political game ‘who 
gets Belarus’. In the wake of the military conflict 
between Georgia and Russia qualitative changes 
took place in the EU policy towards Belarus. The 
political line of the democratization of Belarus 
and isolation of A. Lukashenka’s regime that was 
so far predominant was gradually substituted by 
the ‘twofold’ strategy. On the one hand, the activi-
ties related to the opposition forces of Belarus are 
continued (the line of democratization). On the 
other hand, the policy of the ‘selective’ inclusion 
of the Belarusian political regime the aim whereof 
is to decrease the dependence of the country on 
Russia gains momentum. Otherwise stated, the EU 
considers the political and economic independence 
of Belarus to be a priority. Nevertheless, the work in 
the direction of the democratization of the regime 
is also considered, if somewhat less stressed, to be 
very important.
A. Lukashenka’s visit fits nicely into the framework 
of the said ‘twofold’ strategy. The event is also fully 
in line with the interests of some business groups 
on Lithuania (export of fertilizers via Klaipeda port 
and entrance into the internal market of Belarus). 
On the other hand, this opens the window of the 
possibility for the Belarusian president to play his 
political game. A. Lukashenka assesses the ‘thaw’ 
in the relationship with the EU proceeding from 
very simple logic – to ‘put everybody over’. A. Lu-
kashenka needs the EU and Lithuania as a window 
into Europe only to the extent, which enables him 
to receive financial resources for the floundering 
economy of the country, open the EU market for 
Belarusian products or consolidate negotiation 
powers in its relation with Moscow. But as soon the 
EU requirements will start permeating the internal 
policy of Belarus A. Lukashenka will be the first to 
close all those ‘opened windows’ and ‘new historical 
pages of mutual relations’. The President of Belarus 
understands perfectly well that further prospects 
In September Lithuania became the second EU 
member after Italy that welcomed the President of 
Belarus after the period of sanctions and isolation 
in EU – Belarus relations. Lithuania’s interest in 
Belarusian market is obvious and understandable. 
However, A. Lukashenka is not solely an observer in 
this game. While opening the door for investments 
and funds from the EU he is trying to maintain 
Kremlin’s support. Vytautas Sirijos Gira presents 
an assessment of A. Lukashenka’s ‘multi-vector’ 
foreign policy from a Lithuanian perspective in 
this edition.
During his visit to Lithuania A. Lukashenka pre-
sented plans to build a new nuclear power plant 
close to the Lithuanian border. The President of 
Lithuania D. Grybauskaite judged this intention 
critically and rejected the invitation to join the 
project. Many factors stand against construction 
of this power plant: from environmental concerns 
to absence of financing. Alena Daneika’s article 
brings answers to the questions whether any of 
these arguments will keep A. Lukashenka from 
building the power plant. 
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for the development of his regime depend mostly 
not on the EU but on Moscow.
Comparing the levers possessed by the EU and 
Russia with respect to A. Lukashenka’s regime it 
becomes increasingly evident that Moscow is in a 
much stronger position. At any time Moscow can 
draw its ‘energy card’ (make Belarus pay the Euro-
pean price for the gas supplied) and thus destroy 
the clay-footed social and economic system of the 
country. So far A. Lukashenka managed to escape 
from the given scenario by allowing the Russian 
capital to privatize state enterprises operating in a 
certain strategic branch of economy. This, however, 
may turn out to be insufficient in the future. Does 
the EU possess a similar channel of influence on 
Belarus? Apparently not, since all sanctions so far 
imposed by the EU (removal of Belarus from the 
EU preferential trade system, refusal to issue visas 
to A. Lukashenka and dozens of the top officials 
of Belarus, freeze of bilateral relations as well 
as other measures) failed to produce any effect. 
Thus, as long as the EU fails to possess a lever of 
similar strength that is possessed by Moscow with 
respect to Minsk the ‘thaw’ of the EU and Belarus 
relations will continue to be conducted according 
to A. Lukashenka’s scenario.
Thus, the most important question that should 
be posed by the EU and Lithuanian foreign policy 
decision makers is the following: how should the 
rules of the game of mutual relations with Belarus 
be consolidated in order to obviate the possibility 
for A. Lukashenka to unilaterally alter them? One 
of the outstanding examples of such unilateral 
‘rules of the game’ was the IMF loan of 2.5 billion 
USD devoted to the stabilization of the  economy 
of Belarus on condition that Belarus consolidates 
its monetary control and liberalizes its economy. 
Having assessed the actions of Belarus’ authorities 
to liberalize its economy, the IMF had to state that 
the process of the liberalization of the economy of 
Belarus is only ‘cosmetic’. The fact that the processes 
of privatization and liberalization of the economy 
(private sector of the Belarusian economy produces 
25-30 per cent of the GDP) are fragmentary and fail 
to exercise considerable influence on the economy 
is also apparent. A. Lukashenka continues to be 
the pioneer, arbiter and the final decision maker 
of the given processes. All privatization contracts 
for the period 2007-2008 have been concluded only 
with A. Lukashenka’s approval. Centralization of 
the Belarusian economy enables A. Lukashenka to 
maintain control of the bureaucratic apparatus and 
ensure political loyalty in exchange for restricted 
access to economic resources. Otherwise stated, 
all reforms are under control and therefore there 
is no sense of speaking about some stable ‘rules of 
the game’ in the given state. Even if a Lithuanian 
capital enterprise manages to find a way into the 
Belarusian market, the change of political wind 
(A. Lukashenka’s political games) may result in the 
elimination of those Lithuanian investments. There-
fore, it is vital to cautiously assess A. Lukashenka’s 
aspiration to play ‘rapprochement’ with the EU. 
A. Lukashenka’s ‘multi-vector’ foreign policy, 
‘griping’ between the EU and Russia show that his 
ultimate aim is to receive as much financial assist-
ance as possible (loans, grants and subsidies) as well 
as avoid any commitments to carry out structural 
reforms, to liberalize the country’s economy and 
alter the political system. A. Lukashenka’s conces-
sions to the West may be only strictly limited. In 
the long term perspective the West sees Belarus as 
a democratic country free of A. Lukashenka and 
there should be no doubts that in the long run the 
EU will raise the democratic crossbar. This will 
automatically mean that A. Lukashenka’s game of 
the ‘rapprochement’ with the West is over. In other 
words, in his relations with Russia A. Lukashenka 
tries to solve the dilemma between independence 
or loyalty, whereas in the West front the dilemma 
is of a totally different character: persistence of 
the regime or democracy. Those dilemmas are of 
a completely different character since in the first 
case A. Lukashenka can still  design his political 
future (at least on the level of the Russian governor 
status), whereas in the second - definitely not.
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The decision to construct a nuclear power station 
(NPS) has been made. However, the implementa-
tion of the construction schedule may be hindered 
by the absence of financing. 
The agreement between Russian JSC AtomStroyEx-
port and national design and scientific research 
enterprise BelNIPIenergoprom to develop the 
investment plan for the construction of the NPS 
in Belarus was signed on August 31st, 2009 in 
Minsk. This was officially announced by the At-
omStroyExport’s media service, a state engineering 
company subject to Rosatom that is implementing 
intergovernmental agreements on the construc-
tion of nuclear power objects abroad.  Currently 
AtomStroyExport makes up approximately 20% of 
the global nuclear market.
Consequently, in late August the President of Be-
larus stated that the agreement with Russia on the 
financing of the NPS in Belarus has been reached, 
the first credit should by provided in 2010. While 
the amount of the credit is still being negotiated, 
the infrastructure for the NPS is being developed 
in the Ostrovets district of Grodno region. Full-
fledged construction is scheduled to start on 
January 1, 2010.
The answer to the question what can stop the 
construction of the NPS pertains to the domain 
of hypothetical speculations. The only thing that 
can thwart the implementation of the current plan 
is the absence of financing. Belarusian specialists 
who are already engaged in preparatory work for 
the construction allow for this possibility. However, 
they are confident that the idea itself will hardly be 
abandoned. They point out that even in democratic 
countries having traditions of open public debates 
environmentalists’ protests and scholars’ arguments 
do not always lead to renunciation of the idea to 
construct NPS.  
There is no doubt that the Chernobyl disaster came 
as one of the most powerful arguments for the 
opponents of the NPS. After the fall of the Berlin 
wall the NPS constructed by Soviet specialists near 
German town Greifswald on the Baltic coast was 
shut down. The construction of the station at the 
western borders of the former Democratic Republic 
of Germany was terminated. Nonetheless, it is being 
claimed that there is no realistic replacement for 
electric energy generated by NPS. Renewable en-
ergy sources comprise but a small part of necessary 
energy. This approach is supported by the fact that 
a number of NPS are operating in various countries 
across the world as well as new projects are being 
developed in the USA, Japan, China, and Russia. 
In France 70% of consumed energy is generated by 
the NPS. In Belarus’ neighbour Lithuania, Ignalina’s 
NPS, which has the Chernobyl-type reactor, is to be 
replaced by a new NPS with a reactor of a different, 
non-Russian type. Yet in Europe, unlike in Belarus, 
nuclear energy develops concurrently with the 
debates on its appropriateness and dangers.
Belarusian analysts refer to Germany’s experience 
in particular since Germany, unlike Belarus, has a 
tradition of conducting public debates. In Euro-
pean countries debates and their conclusions as 
well as the system of political structure provide a 
mechanism for public opinion to influence various 
political forces that consequently affect state-level 
decision making process. As far as the construction 
of the NPS in Belarus is concerned, there has been 
no public debate on the issue. Even if such a debate 
took place, it would hardly affect the final decision 
given the present-day power system in Belarus. 
In the past President A. Lukashenka has voiced an 
idea of holding a referendum on the construction 
of the NPS. However, neither the debates, nor the 
referendum has been conducted despite the fact 
that Belarus has signed two international conven-
tions (Espoo Convention and Aarhus Convention) 
that oblige it to promote public participation in 
environmental decision-making, which apparently 
comprises the construction of a NPS. Yet the deci-
sion to build a nuclear power station was made a 
year ago at a Security Council meeting without 
any debates.
Setting aside the political aspect, Belarusian special-
ists believe that the community protesting against 
the NPS relies on universally known facts con-
cerning dangers and ecological harm that nuclear 
power industry poses. Besides, one should bear 
in mind circumstances of force majeure, disasters 
and catastrophes, consequences of which affect 
generations to come.
However, the public hardly has the possibility 
to assess the NPS project, the extent of its safety 
and reliability. Certain confidentiality of technical 
documentation, even in democratic countries, is 
explained by trade secret considerations. Neverthe-
less, specialists believe that it is possible to familiar-
ize the public with nuclear project and provide the 
society with clues for its reasonable evaluation. In 
the case of Belarus, the decision making authorities 
or, to be more precise, those who are engaged in 
the implementation of the decision made by the 
country’s leadership, up till now have been dis-
seminating vague statements: our NPS will be the 
safest, the most reliable, etc. 
Belarusian physicians who for a long time have been 
working in the field of nuclear energy stress that 
even specialists do not have access to the informa-
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tion on the technical characteristics of the future 
Belarusian NPS. Georgij Lepin, professor, doctor of 
science and activist of the movement Scientists for 
nuclear-free Belarus, points out that any attempt 
to make a stand against nuclear power is regarded 
nearly as an attempt against the President himself. 
During his speech in Chojniki, A. Lukashenka 
claimed straightforwardly that opponents of the 
NPS are not scientists, but bandits in science and 
enemies of the people. 
Defending his right to protest and access expert 
assessment of the construction plans, Georgij Lepin 
refers to West European practices, in particular the 
experience of German colleagues, opponents of 
nuclear energy. According to Mr. Lepin, they may 
freely make their opinion, scientific conclusions 
and expert evaluations available to the public, 
familiarize members of various state institutions, 
political and social organizations with the results 
of their scientific research. 
The decision to abandon the construction of the 
NPS (yet not the idea in general) may be made not 
so much due to pragmatic and rational considera-
tions and estimates of expenses related to personnel 
training, safety enforcement, but rather due to the 
negative economic context. Such a conclusion is 
supported in the study A system analysis of the 
transformation of the security of the Republic of 
Belarus in the process of developing nuclear energy, 
conducted by Vyachaslau Pazdnyak, head of ana-
lytical centre Wider Europe and recently presented 
in Minsk. In the study Mr. Pazdnyak points out to 
the risks of making a decision on the construction 
of a NPS construction under the conditions of an 
economic crisis since real costs are hard to estimate. 
Besides, the shutdown of the station costs approxi-
mately the same as its construction. Should the crisis 
affect the financial capacity of Russian Federation, 
it will not be able to provide financing that would 
automatically mean grave losses. Moreover, one 
has to have in mind geopolitical risks related to the 
selection of a Russian contractor. Belarus already 
has the experience of economic wars with Russia. 
Should a situation aggravate, focus solely on Rus-
sian partners jeopardizes the plans of building the 
nuclear station in Belarus.  
Nuclear energy researchers forecast in about 30 
years new, more reliable and efficient nuclear as well 
as alternative energy technologies will emerge. If the 
first unit of the Belarusian NPS is to be launched 
in 2016, one cannot disregard the risk that during 
the station will become technologically outdated. 
Moreover, a number of scholars believe that raw 
uranium may be exhausted in the coming 60 years. 
Given that countries which have announced the 
intention to resolve the energy security problem 
by way of constructing a NPS implement their 
plans, the aggravation of competition under the 
conditions of the shrinking natural resource can-
not be avoided, which will cause price surge, and 
consequently, the economic substantiality of nuclear 
energy will be questioned. 
Another aspect highlighted in the aforementioned 
research is the interdependence between nuclear 
energy development and national security system. 
The construction of the NPS may mean a dramatic 
quantitative and qualitative change of the national 
security system that would be expensive, complex 
and time-consuming. The extent and seriousness 
of this assumption is supported by a statement 
made by Janis Aizsalnieks, attaché of the Minsk 
Office of the European Commission (EC). During 
a training that took place on August 9th, 2009 in the 
framework of the project Strengthening Regional 
Capabilities for Prevention and Response to Chemi-
cal Emergencies with a Threat of Trans-Boundary 
Effects in the Region Belarus-Latvia-Lithuania, 
Aizsalnieks stated that EC is prepared to provide 
Belarus with technical aid in developing the nuclear 
safety programme. 
As for the Belarus’ aspirations to become independ-
ent from Russia’s energy resources, the construction 
of the NPS is clearly not the way out. Primarily 
since no other country would take up financing 
the its construction, except for Russia. Secondly, 
Russia will provide the station with everything 
needed, from equipment to nuclear waste removal. 
Thirdly, Russia will be supplying uranium. Eventu-
ally, rather than being ‘gas-dependent’ on Russia, 
Belarus will be ‘uranium-dependent’ on the same 
Eastern neighbour.
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